Threat modeling
A STRIDE-driven security threat model for a system you describe to the agent. The workflow walks scoping and DFD construction → six-way STRIDE specialist analysis over the diagram → review → enrichment and scoring → mitigation → report, grounding the enrichment in the gateway's threat-framework corpora. Keeping a threat model current as your systems change is Living Architecture, in development, with pilots open soon.
Tier
Every plan. Free runs 1 STRIDE threat model a month and Solo runs 2, both on a system you describe, using the full workflow lifecycle (start_workflow, submit_response, generate_report, plus the create_dfd and recommend_subagents specialists). At those two plans the report arrives as a rendered document or structured JSON, the run grounds its enrichment at the plan's own search scope, and the allowance is a hard stop, with no overage.
Premium raises the allowance to 5 runs a month and widens what a run can do: the LINDDUN privacy and TARA risk families, and case law and agency guidance pulled into the enrichment passes, cited verbatim, with the report as structured JSON plus HTML, PDF and DOCX renders. Team raises the quota to 20 runs per seat a month and adds document grounding: evidence from your own uploaded architecture docs. The threat-pattern lookups (search with sources=['threat-frameworks']) and the CVE tools (search_cve and friends) are available for briefs without the workflow. Public CVE details, KEV status, EPSS scores, known exploits, product search, and feed freshness remain on Free, as do the CAPEC, CWE, and D3FEND catalogues. Team adds effective-risk rescoring against customer asset context, review decisions, and OpenVEX export.
What you ask the agent
Using Ansvar: run a threat model for our payments service.
It's a Go API behind nginx, talking to Postgres and Stripe,
with OAuth-authenticated customer clients and a Keycloak IdP.The agent calls start_workflow(workflow_type="threat_model") and guides the rest from there.
Stages
- Scoping & DFD: system description and key assets, a scope check, then data-flow-diagram construction: the agent extracts components, data flows, trust zones, and assets, validates the graph with
create_dfd, and shows you the rendered Mermaid diagram for review before analysis starts. On Team and Company, architecture diagrams and design docs go in viaregister_document; on Free, Solo and Premium, you describe the system in the conversation instead. - Document collection (Team+): supporting evidence: existing security controls, network diagrams, IAM policies. Runs on Free, Solo and Premium skip this stage and work from the described system.
- STRIDE analysis: one dispatch step that fans out six STRIDE-category specialists (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) over the reviewed DFD (in parallel where the client supports subagents, sequentially elsewhere) and merges their threat lists into one register with a coverage matrix.
- Threat review: user-reviewed threat register before enrichment.
- Threat enrichment & scoring: adds attack-chain references and related patterns from the framework corpora via
search(MITRE ATT&CK, ATLAS, CAPEC, CWE and D3FEND on every plan), then scores severity and likelihood per threat. - Mitigation: for each high-priority threat, one or more proposed mitigations with cited control sources (NIST, ISO, sector frameworks where the agent has them in scope).
- Report:
generate_report(workflow_id)assembles the threat-model document. The structured threat list is also retrievable viaget_workflow_threats(workflow_id)for programmatic downstream use.
What you get back
A structured threat model: system scope, components with type and technology, threat register with STRIDE category, severity, likelihood, and mitigation. Each factual finding carries a served evidence reference or an unresolved marker. The threat list is queryable independently of the prose report, which is useful if you want to roll the findings into a ticketing system.